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CASENOTES 
FEDERAL TORT CLAIMS ACT-A LIBERALIZED 
INTERPRETATION 
509 
In an action against the United States under the Federal 
Tort Claims Act, claimant sought recovery for cargo damage 
which resulted from the grounding of the tug and barge carrying 
the cargo. Clain1ant alleged that the grounding was caused by" 
the failure of Coast Guard personnel to check and repair a navi-
gational light, or to notify claimant that the light was not operat-
ing. A motion to dismiss on the theory that a private person 
would not be liable under "like circumstances," as required by 
the act, was granted by the district court. The court of appeals 
affirmed.1 Certiorari was granted2 and the judgment affirmed 
by an equally divided court.3 On rehearing, held: reversed, on 
the ground that a private person would be liable under "like 
circumstances." For example, one undertaking to warn the public 
of danger and thereby inducing reliance would be liable for a 
failure to perform his good samaritan task in a careful manner:i, 
The instant case is important not only because it clarifies a 
previously hazy area but also because the logic of the case could 
be used to greatly liberalize recovery against the Government. 
In 1946 the federal government generally waived its immunity 
to tort liability by the passage of the Federal Tort Claims Act. 0 
Immunity was reserved, however, in specific areas.6 In addi-
1 Indian Towing Co. v. United States, 211 F.2d 886 (5th Cir. 1954). 
2 Indian Towing Co. v. United States, 348 U.S. 810 (1954). 
3 Indian Towing Co. v. United States, 349 U.S. 902 (1955) (per curiam 
decision). 
4Indian Towing Co. v. United States. 350 U.S. 61, 64-65 (1955). 
u 28 U.S.C. §§ 1346(b), 2671-80 (Supp. 1952). 
6 28 U.S.C. § 2680 (Supp. 1952) exempts from its operation twelve 
classes of tort claims including (1) claims based upon acts or omissions 
of employees and agencies in the execution of a statute or regulation or 
based upon discretionazy functions or duties; (2) claims arising out of 
loss, miscarriage, or negligent transmission of postal matter; ( 3) claims 
arising in respect of the assessment or collection of ta..'i:es or custom 
duties, or the detention of goods or merchandise by customs or law-en-
forcement officers; ( 4) claims for damages caused by the imposition of a 
quarantine by the United States; (5) claims arising from injuries to vessels 
or persons while passing through the Panama Canal locks or zone waters; 
( 6) claims arising out of assault, battery, false imprisonment, false arrest, 
malicious prosecution, abuse of process. libel, slander, misrepresentation, 
deceit, or interference with contract rights; (7) claims for damages 
caused by the fiscal operations of the Treasuzy; (8) claims arising out 
of combatant activities of militazy or naval forces, or the Coast Guard, 
during time of war; (9) claims arising in foreign countries; (10) claims 
arising from activities of TVA; (11) claims arising from activities of the 
Panama Railroad Co.; and (12) claims relating to claims or suits in ad-
miralty against the United States. 
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tion, the act states that "the United States shall be liable . . in 
the same manner and to the same extent as a private individual 
under like circumstances .... " 7 (Emphasis added) in accordance 
with the law of the state where the alleged negligence occurs. 
The Government has contended that this phrase should be inter-
preted to exclude many claims not falling within the specific 
exceptions of the act. At first, the dichotomy urged by the Gov-
ernment was that of governmental functions as contrasted to 
proprietary functions, with liability only as to the latter.8 But 
this view was rejected in a series of cases.9 The Government 
has also argued that risky activities which are authorized by 
Congress should be immune.10 This was also rejected. Finally, 
the Government narrowed its argument by asserting that only 
imiquely governmental activities were exempt from liability.11 
Such an activity is one, by Government definition, which has no 
exact private counterpart. Thus, military activities, prison acti-
vities, taxing activities, and explosions of nuclear devices would 
be termed uniquely governmental. In contrast, claimants have 
argued for a liberal construction; i.e., the use of an analogy to 
similar private activities. 
The narrow construction urged by the Government was sus-
tained in four cases. In Feres v. United States,12 liability was 
denied when soldiers were injured by negligent medical treat-
ment, and by negligent maintenance of quarters. The Supreme 
Court rejected the analogy to the doctor-patient and landlord-ten-
ant relationships, and reasoned that the relationship of soldier to 
government is unique since no private individual can conscript an 
army. In Sigmon v. United States,13 liability was denied when a 
prison inmate was injured in a prison machine shop. Rejecting 
the employer-employee relationship, a district court found the 
activity to be uniquely governmental since no private person 
could incarcerate another. Thus, in these two cases, by ignoring 
7 28 U.S.C. § 2674 (Supp. 1952). 
s This argument was based upon implications from certain sections of 
the act. See 28 u.s.c. §§ 2674, 2680 (Supp. 1952). 
9 Air Transport Associates v. United States, 221 F.2d 467, 470 (9th 
Cir. 1955); Mid-Central Fish Co. v. United States, 210 F.2d 263 (8th Cir. 
1954), cert. denied, 347 U.S. 967 (1954); Somerset Seafood Co. v. United 
States, 193 F.2d 631 (4th cir. 1951); Claypool v. United States, 98 F. Supp. 
7·02 (S.D. Cal. 1951); Cerri v. United States, 80 F. Supp. 831 (N.D. Cal. 
1948). 
10 Bullock v. United States, 133 F. Supp. 885, 891 (D. Utah 1951). 
11 Supra note 4. 
12 340 U.S. 134 (1950). 
13110 F. Supp. 9·06 (W.D. Va. 1953). 
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the activity at the operational level, and looking only at the over-
all character of the activity, the courts have found that the ac-
tivity was uniquely governmental. This uniquely governmental 
technique has also been applied to the operational level. In Dalehite 
v. United States,14 a shipboard fire, caused by government negli-
gence, was negligently allowed to spread by geverrunent fire-
fighters. The negligent acts which caused the fire were held 
to come under the "discretionary act" exception of the act; thus, 
the question of whether the over-all aspect of the activity was 
uniquely governmental was not raised. But the Supreme Court 
found fire-fighting, the operational level activity, to be a uniquely 
governmental activity, thus barring recovery. In another case, 
a. lower federal court used the same technique to deny liability 
for loss of personal property caused by government negligence 
in failing to properly supervise migratory workers.lt; 
Thus, the uniquely governmental technique has been used 
to preclude liability under the act at the over-all or operational 
level of an activity. 
In the instant case the Government relied on the claim that 
the activity at its operational level had no exact counterpart in 
private activity.rn But the Court interpreted the phrase "like 
circumstances" to mean that recovery will be allowed if a private 
person has carried or could car1'y on an analogous activity at the 
operational level. Thus, since a private person could conceivably 
operate a lighthouse and since private persons do operate analog-
ous activities, e.g., railroad crossing lights; recovery would be 
allowed. 
This reasoning would seem to destroy the validity of the 
Feres, Sigmon, and Dalehite decisions since analogous private ac-
tivities can be found for the so-called uniquely governmental 
activities of these cases. The doctor-patient and landlord-tenant 
situations are analogous to the Feres situations at the operational 
level.17 In the Sigmon case, the employee-employer relationship 
14 346 U.S. 15 (1953). 
15 Goodwill Industries v. United States, 218 F.2d 270 (5th Cir. 1954). 
16 Indian Towing Co. v. United States, 350 U.S. 61, 64 (1955). 
17 Even if the Court had found that there was an analogous activity at 
the operational level, the· claimant would still have been blocked from 
recovery since the Court held that the Army's comprehensive compensa-
tion plan made the activity uniquely governmental at the over-all level. 
This reasoning was extended to the prison industries in the Sigmon de-
c1s10n. It should be noted, however, that there are comparable com-
pensation plans in private industry in view of state workman's compensa-
tion laws and the health and accident insurance now carried by most 
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provides the analogy at the operational level. The analogy on 
the over-all plane is more difficult to find. But an analogy can 
be had to private sanitariums which maintain similar activities, 
i.e., security and rehabilitation. As to the Dalehite case, the fire-
fighting departments of major corporations which do not wish 
to rely on municipal facilities provide an analogy in private ac-
tivity to the federal fire-fighting crews. 
At least one federal court. has put this type of reasoning 
to use in holding the Government liable. A cause of action has 
been deemed to exist where damage was allegedly caused by 
negligence connected with the explosion of a nuclear device since 
it can be analogized to private blasting activities.18 
It appears obvious, therefore, that for even the most uniquely 
governmental activity, a "like circumstance" can be found in pri-
vate activity. For instance, taxing can be likened to the collec-
tion of private dues by a fraternal organization, the postal sys-
tem can be likened to the privately operated railway express 
system, and the spread of pestilence can be compared to the 
spread of noxious weeds. But the question is whether the Court 
will carry this reasoning to its limits or whether it will seize 
upon distinguishing factors to act as a brake on the use of the 
analogy. The instant case, for example, involves the elements of 
volunteering and reliance. Lower federal courts have relied 
heavily on these elements in holding the Government liable,19 and 
thus these elements may provide the Court with a convenient rea-
son for refusing to apply its principles to other cases not in-
volving reliance. In this connection, it should be noted that the 
large corporations. But even if this hurdle is surmounted by the claim-
ant, he is still faced with the fact that no private activity can conscript or 
incarcerate individuals. Thus. if the Court wishes to segregate these 
areas from liability, it has a sound basis on which to rest its uniquely 
governmental dichotomy. 
1s Bulloch v. United States, 133 F. Supp. 885 (1955). 
19 Eastern Air Lines v. Union Trust Company, 221 F.2d 62 (D.C. Cir. 
1955), aff'd per curiam, United States v. Union Trust Co., 350 U.S. 907 
(1955) (a control tower gave out information which resulted in plane 
crashes); United States v. Lawter, 219 F.2d 559 (5th Cir. 1955) (the 
Coast Guard negligently conducted a helicopter rescue which resulted in 
the death of a person being rescued); Bevilacqua v. United States, 122 F. 
Supp. 493 (W.D. Penn. 1954) (the Government failed to maintain a 
navigational light on a dam which resulted in a boat sailing over a dam). 
Where the quality of reliance is weak, as in relying on weather fore-
casts, liability has been denied. Mid-Central Fish Co. v. United States, 210 
F.2d. 263 (8th Cir. 1954), cert. denied, 347 U.S. 967 (1954). 
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Court, in the instant case, specifically refused to over-rule the 
Feres and Dalehite decisions, perhaps because these cases didn't 
involve the essential element of reliance. Anyway, the path is 
clear for the Court's distinguishing the present case from future 
fact situations which have more elements in common with Feres, 
Sigmon, and Dalehite. In this connection, it should be noted that 
there is not an analogy which can be drawn to a government 
activity which would be more strained and far-fetched than the 
one drawn in the instant case, i.e., that a private person could 
operate a lighthouse. The restrictions placed on lighthouse opera-
tions by the Government make the operation of a lighthouse by 
a private individual practically impossible.20 If the Court is not 
reluctant to draw such an analogy in this area, there is little to 
indicate that the use of the analogy won't result in quite a liberal 
interpretation being placed on the act. 
The basic question becomes, therefore, whether the Court's 
reasoning in the instant case should be extended to its limits. This 
involves a consideration of the act's safeguards against excessive 
liability, the policy considerations inherent in the act, and other 
policy factors. 
The act is sweeping in its waiver of immunity, and it seems 
inconsistent to whittle the scope of this immunity by refinements 
not spelled out in the act, especially since the act's exceptions 
are so clearly stated.21 In addition, even if recovery is denied 
under the act because of narrow construction, Congress may be 
forced to enact relief legislation or the claimant may bring a 
private bill to remedy the inequity.22 Thus, a narrow construc-
tion will def eat one of the primary reasons for the passage of 
the act, namely, the elimination of congressional consideration of 
tort claims.23 A narrow construction has been rejected by some 
lower courts: viz, (1) the rejection of the governmental-proprie-
tary dichotomy,24 (2) the inclusion of maritime torts as well as 
common-law torts,25 (3) inclusion of negligent acts following the 
use of discretion,26 (4) the limitation of the assault and battery 
20 33 C.F.R. § 66 (1949). 
21 Supra note 6. 
22 See, e.g., Pub. L. No. 378, 69 Stat. 707 (1955) (Texas City disaster 
relief); Priv. L. No. 194, 65 Stat. A74 (1951) (claim arising in foreign 
country); Priv. L. No. 135, 65 Stat. A52 (1951) (government employee 
acting outside scope of authority). 
23Somerset Seafood Co. v. United States, 193 F.2d 631 (4th Cir. 1951); 
Cerri v. United States, 80 F. Supp. 831 (N.D. Cal. 1948). 
24 Supra note 8. 
25Somerset Seafood Co. v. United States. 19::! F.2d 631 (4th Cir. 1951). 
26 Supra note 4. 
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exception of the act to government employees' assaults as con-
trasted to assaults of prisoners who were given the opportunity 
to assault by the negligence of a government employee.27 
It is argued that an extension of the reasoning of the in-
stant case is likely to expose the government to novel causes of 
action or excessive claims.28 First, it should be noted that just 
because a cause of action is novel does not mean that it is "spuri-
ous." If novel claims were never allowed, the law would forever 
stand still. Often an analogy can be used to break through 
fictitous and antiquated restrictions in tort law which hamper 
the administration of justice. For instance, the federal courts 
have found duties (1) to give adequate warning of dangerous 
conditions to navigators,29 and (2) to limit the use of water as a 
riparian owner to a reasonable use,30 even though the state law 
didn't directly support such principles. Also, a court has allowed 
the use of negligence as a theory of recovery where state law made 
the defendant liable without fault.31 These cases follow the 
apparent desire of the courts to give a liberal construction to 
the act in an effort to effectuate its purpose. 
The act provides additional safeguards against spurious, novel 
or excessive claims through the elimination of juries,32 elimina-
tion of punitive damages,33 and through the specific exceptions of 
the act. In addition, the normal rules of tort law, such as the 
risk theory, will often restrict liability. 
With the growth of western civilization and its emphasis on 
government as existing for the individual, as well as vice-versa, 
the idea that "The King can do no wrong" has fallen into dis-
repute; one result being the Federal Tort Claims Act. There 
seems to be a reluctance on the part of the courts, however, to 
allow extensive claims. This has been suggested as one of the 
reasons for the Dalehite decision,34 which involved approximately 
21 Panella v. United States, 216 F.2d 622 (2d Cir. 1954). 
2s Dalehite v. United States, 346 U.S. 15, 43 (1953); Nat. Mfg. Co. v. 
United States, 210 F.2d 263, 275 (8th Cir. 1954), cert. denied, 347 U.S. 
967 (1954). 
29 Dye v. United States, 210 F.2d 123 (6th Cir. 1954). 
30United States v. Praylou, 208 F.2d 291 (4th Cir. 1953), cert. denied, 
347 U.S. 934 (1954). 
31 Smith v. United States. 113 F. Supp. 131 (D. Del. 1953). 
32 28 U.S.C. § 2402 (Supp. 1952). 
33 28 U.S.C. § 2674 (Supp. 1952). 
34 See Dalehite v. United States, 346 U.S. 15, 60 (1953) (dissenting 
opinion); 32 Tex. L. Rev. 474 (1954); 23 Tenn. L. Rev. 243 (1954); 5 
Syracuse L. Rev. 101 (1953). 
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two hundred million dollars. While such a loss would add but a 
minute amount to the tax dollar of the multitude of taxpayers, 
it may be ruinous to the individuals sustaining the loss. It is 
difficult to see why a person should support a larger proportion 
of the expenses of maintaining the Government than is provided 
for in the taxation system. Congress has seen fit to appropriate 
huge amounts for natural disasters such as floods and droughts, 
and for military and economic disasters in foreign countries. 
Surely the disasters caused by the Government's own negligence 
can be compensated for out of tax funds. If Congress feels that 
liability for certain activities involves too great a possible drain 
upon the Treasury, it can, as it has done with flood control dam-
age, amend the act to make a specific exception.3::; It seems far 
better for Congress to make exceptions in light of its knowledge 
of expected budget commitments, than for the courts to do so. 
It is submitted that there are adequate protections within 
the act against spurious or excessive claims, and that the logic 
of the instant case can be used to establish guideposts which can 
result in a liberalization in tort law; that the policy of restrict-
ing private bills calls for a liberal construction as does the policy 
of equality of economic burden among taxpayers in maintaining 
any given governmental activity; and that the legislative body, 
with its vast fact finding powers and knowledge of expected 
demands upon the Treasury, is better equipped to add restrictions 
upon the act than is the judiciary. The instant case provides 
the vehicle of logic by which such a liberal interpretation can be 
attained. 
Charles K. Thompson, '56 
35 33 U.S.C. § 702(c) (Supp. 1952). 
